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639 
SOCIAL NETWORKING V. THE EMPLOYMENT-
AT-WILL DOCTRINE: A POTENTIAL DEFENSE 
FOR EMPLOYEES FIRED FOR FACEBOOKING, 
TERMINATED FOR TWITTERING, BOOTED  
FOR BLOGGING, AND SACKED FOR  
SOCIAL NETWORKING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is doing it: Grandma Margaret, Ginkgo the Black Labrador, 
and even President Obama have all jumped into the social networking 
craze via Facebook and a host of other social media options now available 
in cyberspace.
1
 With more than 800 million active Facebook users, over 
half of which visit the site daily,
2
 more than 181 million blogs bouncing 
around the blogosphere,
3
 and Twitter being the 15th most visited webpage 
in the world,
4
 the constant barrage of social media-related firings popping 
up in the news
5
 should thus come as little surprise. Moreover, the rate of 
these high-profile terminations will probably accelerate in the next few 
years as the original college-aged Facebook users
6
 begin their professional 
 
 
 1. See Ginkgo’s Facebook Page, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/ 
pages/Ginkgo/155110637845600 (last visited Jan. 2, 2012); Margaret Strayer’s Facebook Page, 
FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/profile.php?id=100001306798922 (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2012); President Barack Obama’s Facebook Page, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www 
.facebook.com/home.php#!/barackobama (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 2. Statistics, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2012). Cf. Mike Ivey, Facebook on the Clock: Businesses Grapple with Social Media Use at 
Work, CAPITAL TIMES (MADISON, WIS.), Mar. 8, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4891993 (noting in 
March 2010, there were just 400 million active Facebook users). 
 3. BlogPulse Stats for Jan. 3, 2012, BLOGPULSE.COM, http://www.blogpulse.com/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 4. The 100 Most-Visited Sites: United States, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/adplanner/ 
static/top1000/index.html (as of Jul. 2011) (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 5. See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers’ Privacy, 66 LA. L. 
REV. 1079, 1087–88 (2006); Stephen D. Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow, Employment Termination 
For Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or a Recipe for Getting 
Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4; Charles Duhigg, World Wide Water Cooler: Can You Be Fired 
for Complaining About Your Boss Online?, LEGAL AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 8. 
 6. When Facebook was created in 2004, it was originally only available to college students. 
Linda Roeder, Where Did Facebook Come From?: The History of Facebook, ABOUT.COM, http:// 
personalweb.about.com/od/makefriendsonfacebook/a/whatisfacebook_5.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
Even with Facebook’s expansion beyond college dormitories to anyone with access to a computer, the 
18–25 age demographic still comprises the largest age group of Facebook users. Justin Smith, College 
Students’ Facebook Use Easing Up Over the Summer, While Parents Logging On in Record Numbers, 
INSIDEFACEBOOK (July 6, 2009), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/07/06/college-students-face 
book-use-easing-up-over-the-summer-while-parents-logging-on-in-record-numbers/. 
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lives and enter the workforce. And when you consider that “[y]ounger 
generations have much less concern about online privacy than older 
generations,”7 reflecting a massive societal shift in privacy norms,8 
employer backlash over employee Internet speech is destined to become a 
permanent landmine in the employment law landscape.  
Yet interestingly, the crux of the employee social networking debate 
lies in the vastly different perceptions held by employers and employees 
on employee privacy rights. While most business executives assert they 
have a right to know about all of their employees’ social networking 
activities, most employees believe their bosses have no right to inquire 
into their non-work lives.
9
 This discrepancy explains why efforts to 
resolve employee Internet speech issues range from giving employers free 
reign to fire employees over any Internet speech—the classic employment-
 
 
 7. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the 
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1237 (2010) (citing John Palfrey & Urs Gasser, BORN 
DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 82 (2008) and Press 
Release, Zogby Int’l, What is Privacy? Poll Exposes Generational Divide on Expectations of Privacy, 
According to Zogby/Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee Survey (Jan. 31, 2007), 
available at http://www.zogby.com/news/2007/01/31/what-is-privacy-poll-exposes-generational-
divide-on-expectations-of-privacy-according-to-zogbycongre/). 
 8. Robison, supra note 7, at 1237. “For users of these [social networking] services, the value of 
networking and communicating with others outweighs the intangible costs to their personal privacy.” 
Id. (citing Matt Asay, Google Privacy Controls: Most People Won’t Care, CNET (Nov. 5, 2009, 9:44 
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10390456-16.html (“[F]or all our hand-wringing over 
privacy—and for good reason—the reality is that most of us, most of the time, really don’t care. Or, 
rather, if accessing useful services or getting work done more efficiently requires some privacy 
concessions, we gladly concede.”)). 
 9. H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Social Networking Data Presents New 
Challenges, 241 N.Y. L.J., June 30, 2009, at 5 (citing Andrew LaVallee, Bosses and Workers Disagree 
on Social Network Privacy, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/05/19/ 
bosses-and-workers-disagree-on-social-network-privacy/). 
 Perhaps the most alarming example to date of how invasive employer inquiries into the social 
networking activities of their employees have become can be found in Maryland. Its Department of 
Corrections, until recently, required job applicants to supply passwords to their social media accounts 
as part of its hiring process. Marie-Andrée Weiss, The Use of Social Media Sites Data By Business 
Organizations in Their Relationship with Employees, 15 J. INTERNET L. 16, 17 (Aug. 2011) (citing 
Letter from Deborah A. Jeon, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, to 
Secretary Gary D. Maynard, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (Jan. 
25, 2011), available at http://www.aclu-md.org/aPress/Press2011/collinsletterfinal.pdf). However, 
Maryland Public Safety Secretary Gary Maynard suspended the policy after receiving a complaint 
letter from the Maryland ACLU. Weiss, supra, at 17 (citing Letter from Secretary Gary D. Maynard, 
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, to Sara N. Love, President, 
American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.aclu-md.org/ 
aPress/Press2011/letter_maynard.pdf). The Maryland legislature also responded in March 2011, 
introducing a bill that “would prohibit an employer from requiring an employee or a candidate to 
provide his online user names or passwords.” Weiss, supra, at 17 (citing S.B. 971, 2011 Leg., 428th 
Sess. (Md. 2011), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2011rs/billfile/sb0971.htm).  
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at-will doctrine
10—to claiming an employee has “a right to a life [and a 
blog] away from work”11 that should be legally protected through lifestyle 
discrimination statutes.
12
 These and other proposals, however, either 
privilege the employer’s interests above the employee’s, or vice versa, 
always leaving one party almost powerless to defend his or her actions 
against the other. A more nuanced proposal, therefore, would balance the 
employer’s interest in protecting the image of—and ensuring the smooth 
functioning of—his or her company13 with the employee’s interest in 
reveling in the unprecedented phenomena of social networking
14
 and 
blogging.
15
 The fulcrum in this balancing act exists as one, seemingly 
obvious, factor: privacy settings. 
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 (“SCA”) makes it unlawful to 
“(1) intentionally access[] without authorization a facility through which 
an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally 
exceed[] an authorization to access that facility . . . and thereby obtain[], 
alter[], or prevent[] authorized access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in electronic storage.”16 As applied to blogging, 
several cases have ruled that an employer who gains unauthorized access 
to an employee’s password-protected blog—and punishes or fires the 
employee for anything appearing on that blog—may have violated the 
SCA and thus would be liable to the employee for that unauthorized 
access.
17
 Yet another case, decided in May 2010, held that gaining 
 
 
 10. See infra note 20. 
 11. Gely & Bierman, supra note 5, at 1086 (citing Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 
LA. L. REV. 945 (2006)). 
 12. See Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling The World Wide Weblog: A Proposal for Blogging, 
Employment-At-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 245, 247, 266 (2007) 
(arguing that blogging should be protected under lifestyle discrimination statutes that prevent 
employers from firing employees for engaging in legal, off-duty activities—like smoking). 
 13. See Ivey, supra note 2 (explaining that, in regard to employees using social networking sites, 
“it’s not the waste of time that presents the greatest risks to employers [but rather] the possible damage 
from leaked company information, negative publicity or worse.”). 
 14. “[T]ime spent on social networks surpassed that for e-mail for the first time in February 
[2009], signaling a paradigm shift in consumer engagement with the Internet.” Teddy Wayne, Social 
Networks Eclipse E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at B3. See also Ivey, supra note 2 (noting that 
“[o]ne 2009 report from the University of Melbourne in Australia found that spending time on 
personal websites provided workers with a ‘mental break’ that ultimately increased their ability to 
concentrate, correlating with a 9 percent increase in productivity.”).  
 15. Gely & Bierman, supra note 5, at 1081–82 (arguing blogging generates trust between 
consumers and information sources by allowing people to access information in a much more personal 
and meaningful way than by gathering information through the mainstream media). See also Krinsky 
v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 237–38 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing emotional benefits of blogging, 
especially when done anonymously). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006). 
 17. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002); Pietrylo v. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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unauthorized access to private Facebook wall posts and MySpace 
comments may also constitute a violation of the SCA.
18
 Although some 
commentators and other courts disagree with courts interpreting the SCA 
in this more expansive way,
19
 these recent rulings may nevertheless 
foreshadow an emerging cause of action for employees fired over their 
social networking or blogging speech against their former employers. 
Therefore, despite the employment-at-will doctrine generally providing 
private sector employers with free reign to fire employees for any Internet 
posting the employer finds objectionable,
20
 the employer will potentially 
face legal problems for basing the employee’s termination solely on a 
posting the employer discovered through an unauthorized access of that 
posting.
21
 Consequently, in a legal system that provides little to no redress 
for private sector employees fired for Internet speech,
22
 the SCA may 
provide such an employee with a cause of action against his or her 
employer if it can be proven that (1) the employee purposely placed 
 
 
Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 18. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 19. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1217–18 (2004). 
 A New York state trial court, faced with a factually similar scenario, held that a defendant could 
subpoena information about a plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace profiles, regardless of any privacy 
protections the plaintiff placed on those profiles. Weiss, supra note 9, at 22 (summarizing Romano v. 
Steelcase, Inc., No. 2006-2233, 2010 WL 3936366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2010) (order granting 
“Defendant access to Plaintiff’s current and historical Facebook and MySpace pages and accounts”)). 
However, Romano focused mainly on the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy regarding her Facebook 
account, only mentioning that the court considered the SCA’s application to the case without any 
analysis of how the SCA would affect the case’s outcome. Romano, 2010 WL 3936366. 
 20. “The vast majority of private sector employees in the United States are employees-at-will, 
who can be dismissed ‘for any reason, even for no reason, without legal liability attaching.’” Ken 
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
1705, 1708 (2004) (quoting Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a 
Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653 (2000)). 
 21. This argument will be developed throughout this Note, but for a general overview, see 
Konop, 302 F.3d at 880 (holding an employee’s claim that his employer violated the SCA by gaining 
unauthorized access to the employee’s password-protected blog the employee maintained for 
discussions about employment conditions will survive the employer’s motion for summary judgment); 
Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (holding that, despite the fact that a fellow co-worker and 
authorized user of an employee’s password-protected MySpace.com chat group provided their 
employer with her log-in information, the claim that the employer violated the SCA will survive a 
motion for summary judgment because the employer coerced—and thus did not gain truly authorized 
access—to the employee’s website); and Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (holding that MySpace 
comments and Facebook wall posts could be considered private, and thus not subject to subpoenas in a 
civil suit, if the MySpace or Facebook user configured his or her privacy settings to prevent the 
general public from accessing his or her information). 
 22. See Deon Roberts, Commentary: Facebook Posts Can Come Back to Haunt Employees, NEW 
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, June 29, 2009; Jake Tapper & Audrey Taylor, Blogging Can Get You in 
Trouble at Work, ABCNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Business/story?id= 
485895&page=1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/4
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privacy settings on his or her social networking or blog website to allow 
access to the site for only a select group of the general public, rather than 
the public at-large,
23
 (2) the employer was not a member of the group 
granted such access by the employee,
24
 (3) the employer viewed the 
Internet posting without authorized access,
25
 and (4) the employer was not 
shown the posting by someone granted access to the employee’s social 
networking or blog website.
26
  
First, this Note will explore how the courts have generally dealt with 
social networking and blogging disputes in both the public and private 
sectors.
27
 Second, this Note will analyze critiques of the courts’ handling 
of these cases and survey alternative solutions. Third, this Note will 
discuss various cases interpreting the SCA and how those rulings could 
apply to an employer-employee Internet speech dispute. Fourth, this Note 
will examine two cases—Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.28 and Pietrylo 
v. Hillstone Restaurant Group
29—actually using the SCA to provide an 
employee a cause of action against his employer for retribution over the 
employee’s Internet speech. Fifth, this Note will look at the principles 
established in Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,
30
 and explore whether 
the reasoning of Konop and Pietrylo can be extended to protect employee 
speech on social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook. Finally, 
this Note will conclude that while SCA protection for this type of Internet 
speech ultimately will be limited, the SCA provides the greatest protection 
to employees who place restrictive privacy settings on their social 
networking sites.  
 
 
 23. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991. 
 24. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 879–80; Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420, at *1. 
 25. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 879–80; Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420, at *1. 
 26. Cf. Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (holding an employee with access to a website cannot 
grant an employer authorization access if the employer coerces the employee to provide that 
information); see also § 2701(c)(2) (noting that no SCA violation occurs “with respect to conduct 
authorized . . . (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that 
user”). 
 27. While this Note focuses on employer-employee disputes over Internet speech in the private 
sector, an overview of the law’s treatment of the issue in the public sector will provide some 
background and set up a contrast to its treatment of the topic in the private sector. 
 28. 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002). For a general explanation of Konop’s reasoning, see supra 
note 21. 
 29. No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). For a general 
explanation of Pietrylo’s reasoning, see supra note 21. 
 30. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010). For a general explanation of Crispin’s reasoning, 
see supra note 21. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. BACKGROUND: STANDARD APPROACHES TO INTERNET SPEECH 
DISPUTES IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
A. Public Sector
31
 
Government employees enjoy much stronger free speech protections 
because, unlike private sector employers, government employers are 
subject to the restraints of the U.S. Constitution.
32
 The First Amendment
33
 
limits the ability of the government to discipline its employees for 
protected speech.
34
 Garcetti v. Ceballos
35
 sets out the most current test for 
determining whether an employee’s speech garners First Amendment 
protection and insulates him or her from termination by a government 
employer.
36
 First, the employee must prove that he spoke as a citizen—
rather than in his capacity as a government worker—and that his speech 
involved a matter of public concern.
37
 Next, a court must decide whether 
the government had a legitimate justification for not providing its 
employees with the same First Amendment protection it affords to normal 
private citizens.
38
 Consequently, while this test provides public employees 
much more speech protection than private employees, the Court 
nevertheless recognizes that government employers have as much of a 
right as private employers to control, manage, and discipline their 
employees when their speech or actions adversely interfere with their job 
responsibilities.
39
 In this aspect, at least, government and private 
 
 
 31. The two main cases discussed in this section, Synder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 
2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) and Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010), 
also appear on a social-networking litigation outline developed by the Smithsonian Institution. Lauryn 
H. Guttenplan, Social Media Resources, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, Mar. 24–26, 
2010, available at WL SR005 ALI-ABA 487. 
 32. Tanya E. Milligan, Virtual Performance: Employment Issues in the Electronic Age, 38 COLO. 
LAW., Feb. 2009, at 29, 30. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
. . . .”). 
 34. While the First Amendment represents the most obvious defense against government 
employers who fire employees over Internet speech, the Fourth Amendment, preventing the 
government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, also 
prevents employees from unreasonably searching the computer files of their employees. The 
“employees’ expectations of privacy and the reasonableness of the search” determine whether the 
government has a right to search through its employees’ digital files. Milligan, supra note 32, at 31. 
The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates these rights against state action, preventing states from 
violating these protections. 
 35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 36. Milligan, supra note 32, at 30 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 31 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19). Note that even speech containing both matters 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/4
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employees tend to receive identical treatment from their respective 
employers if their employers can characterize the employee Internet 
speech as disruptive to the work environment.
40
 
Law regulating student Internet use provides some clues as to what 
constitutes punishable Internet speech in the employment context. For 
example, Synder v. Millersville University,
41
 which discusses a student-
university relationship, upheld a university’s decision to deny a student 
teacher her education degree because of postings she made on her 
MySpace page during her student-teaching practicum.
42
 Despite being told 
in her orientation not to name any students or teachers on her personal 
social networking pages,
43
 the student teacher told her high school 
students about her MySpace page,
44
 discussed students on her MySpace 
page,
45
 posted inappropriate pictures of herself on the site,
46
 and generally 
referred to her teaching supervisors in a negative context on her MySpace 
 
 
of public concern and disruptive, derogatory content cannot always protect a public employee from 
termination. Id. (citing Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding a corrections 
officer referring to a sheriff, who allegedly harassed and allegedly wrongly disciplined political rivals, 
as Hitler in an employee-union-run blog could be terminated without violating the First Amendment)). 
 40. For examples of public employees getting fired or being forced to resign over disruptive 
speech, see Sewell Chan, Facebook Postings Prompt Quick Exit of a City Politician’s Aide, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A18; Andria Simmons, Bus Driver Sues, Saying She was Fired Over 
Facebook Post, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/gwinnett/bus-driver-sues 
-saying-649005.html; Tom Troy, Election Worker Fired for Facebook Posting, TOLEDO BLADE, May 
12, 2010, available at http://www.toledoblade.com/Politics/2010/05/12/Election-worker-fired-for-
Facebook-posting.html. For private employees fired over disruptive speech, see Stephanie Armour, 
Warning: Your Clever Little Blog Could Get You Fired, USA TODAY, June 15, 2005, at 1B; supra note 
22. 
 41. No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 42. Id. at *15. 
 43. During the orientation, the student teacher’s supervisors warned that a student teacher had 
previously been dismissed from his teaching job after posting comments about his host school on “his 
personal webpage.” Id. at *5. 
 44. When the student teacher later told one of her supervisors that she discussed her MySpace 
page with her students, she received a second warning that “it was not proper to discuss her MySpace 
account with [her] students [or] allow students to become involved in her personal life.” Id. 
 45. After the student teacher discovered that one of her students saw a picture of one of the 
student teacher’s friends on her MySpace page and approached her friend outside of school, the 
student teacher reprimanded the student by saying it was inappropriate to contact the student teacher’s 
friends outside of school. The student teacher then posted on her own MySpace page, “First, Bree [the 
student teacher’s friend] said that one of my students was on here looking at my page, which is fine. I 
have nothing to hide. I am over 21, and I don’t say anything that will hurt me (in the long run).” Id. 
See also T. Keung Hui, Teacher’s Facebook rant leads to suspension: Comments on religion irked 
parents, CARY NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.carynews.com/2010/02/24/16203/ 
teachers-facebook-rant-leads-to.html (detailing how a teacher was suspended when she posted on her 
Facebook page that she considered it a “hate crime” when her students placed a Bible on her desk and 
that she “was able to shame her kids” over the occurrence). 
 46. The student teacher posted a picture of herself “wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup 
with a caption that read ‘drunken pirate.’” Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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page.
47
 These MySpace postings, in part, caused her host school to dismiss 
her from the practicum program,
48
 which in turn caused the student’s 
university to deny her an education degree.
49
 
Conversely, other student cases show how the First Amendment can 
insulate Internet speech from punishment. For instance, Evans v. Bayer
50
 
involved a principal suspending
51
 a student for creating a group on 
Facebook called “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”52 
The student sued the school to revoke her suspension and prevent the 
principal from keeping it on her permanent record, arguing that the 
principal’s actions violated her First Amendment rights because she had 
“engaged in an off-campus activity in a non-violent and non-threatening 
public forum” when the speech in question occurred.53 The court denied 
the principal-defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the student’s 
“actions cannot be construed as even remotely disruptive, nor was her 
speech in any way lewd, vulgar, defamatory, promoting drug use or 
violence as seen in other cases.”54 The court determined that while the 
Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
 
 
 47. The student teacher also posted, “I figure a couple of students will actually send me a 
message when I am no longer their official teacher. They keep asking me why I won’t apply there. Do 
you think it would hurt me to tell them the real reason (or who the problem was)?” Id. at *5. One of 
the student teacher’s supervisors, who wrote in her mid-term evaluation that she was poorly prepared 
for class and that she shared her personal life with her students in an unprofessional way, id. at *4, 
believed the student teacher’s MySpace posting was directed at her, id. at *6. The student teacher also 
admitted in trial that she “greatly disliked [this supervisor], believing her criticisms to be unfair.” Id. at 
*5 (citing Tr. May 6, 2007 at 66, 70–74). 
 48. Id. at *6. 
 49. Millersville University students had to complete the student-teaching practicum in order to 
receive a B.S. in Education. Since the student teacher was not allowed to finish her practicum, 
Millersville University could not grant her a B.S. in Education; instead, they awarded her with a B.A. 
in English. Id. at *8-9. 
 50. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 51. The principal suspended the student, a high school senior, for three days and made her drop 
her advanced placement classes for ordinary ‘honors’ classes. Her official suspension notice stated she 
was reprimanded for “‘Bullying/Cyber Bullying/Harassment towards a staff member’ and ‘Disruptive 
Behavior.’” Id. at 1367. 
 52. Id. The student started the group to allow fellow students to vent about their dislike of this 
teacher. The student posted, “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met! To those select 
students who have had the displeasure of having Ms. Sarah Phelps, or simply knowing her and her 
insane antics: Here is the place to express your feelings of hatred.” Id. While the page included a 
picture of the teacher, it did not contain any violent threats or disrupt school activities. Id. The student 
created the page on her home computer after school hours, and the teacher never saw the posting. Id. 
The principal did not hear about the posting until the student took it down, which was two days after 
she created the page. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1367–68. 
 54. Id. at 1376–77. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/4
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District
55
 allows schools to punish students for off-campus speech,
56
 the 
school potentially violated the student’s First Amendment rights because 
(1) her off-campus speech did not cause on-campus disruptions,
57
 (2) her 
speech in general “falls under the wide umbrella of protected [First 
Amendment] speech,”58 and (3) her right to engage in this type of speech 
was clearly established at the time of her punishment.
59
 These factors 
enabled the student to pierce the principal’s claim of qualified immunity60 
against lawsuits from those suing him personally while acting in his 
discretionary responsibility,
61
 thus allowing the student’s suit to proceed. 
B. Private Sector Cases Seeking Government Action (Subpoenas) to 
Unmask Anonymous Private Speakers 
Cases involving one private party requesting a government subpoena in 
a lawsuit against another private party to unmask anonymous Internet 
speakers seem to imply that anonymous Internet speech will usually be 
insulated from disclosure—and thus legal liability—whenever a private 
 
 
 55. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 56. The court in Evans found that student conduct, “in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (quoting Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 513). 
 57. “Student off-campus speech, through generally protected, could be subject to analysis under 
the Tinker standard as well if the speech raises on-campus concerns.” Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1370. 
See also J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 
41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 
(2d Cir. 2007)). The Evans court, however, determined that the student’s off-campus speech did not 
raise on-campus concerns, and thus could not be restricted, because it was Internet speech “made off-
campus, never accessed on-campus, and was no longer accessible when the Defendant [principal] 
learned of it.” Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1372. 
 58. Id. at 1374. The Evans court found that the student’s Facebook posting did not constitute 
fighting words, obscenity, libel, defamation, or any other category of unprotected speech outside First 
Amendment protection, even in a school setting. Id. at 1372–74. 
 59. Id. at 1376–77. While the court acknowledges the principal-defendant’s argument that the 
law regarding student Internet speech is confusing, it disagreed that the student’s speech rights were 
not clearly established at the time of the punishment: for more than forty years, Tinker has required 
“an indication of disruption, future or present” before a school can restrict the First Amendment rights 
of its students. Therefore, because the principal should have been aware of the Tinker discipline 
standard, the student’s speech rights were clearly established at the time of the incident. Id. at 1375–
76. 
 60. “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant violated a 
constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 
1369 (citing Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 61. “An official is acting in his discretionary capacity if he was ‘(a) performing a legitimate job-
related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power to 
utilize.’” Id. (citing Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265). 
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party seeks to use state power to chill Internet speech.
62
 For instance, in 
Krinsky v. Doe 6,
63
 a California state court ruled that Doe 6’s motion to 
quash Krinsky’s subpoena, which Krinsky sought to compel a Yahoo!, 
Inc., (“Yahoo”) message board service to reveal Doe 6’s identity, should 
be granted.
64
 Krinsky, an officer of a company suing posters on this 
message board for defamation,
65
 subpoenaed Yahoo for the identity of 
several anonymous posters. Consequently, Doe 6—one of the posters—
moved to quash the subpoena because the “plaintiff had failed to state a 
claim sufficient to overcome [Doe 6’s] First Amendment rights for . . . 
defamation.”66 After deciding that only a plaintiff making “a prima facie 
showing of the elements of libel”67 could stop a defendant’s motion to 
quash a subpoena to reveal the defendant’s identity,68 the court decided 
that, when “viewed in context,”69 Doe 6’s messages were not actionable: 
“[r]ather, they [fell] into the category of crude, satirical hyperbole which, 
while reflecting the immaturity of the speaker, constitute protected opinion 
under the First Amendment.”70 
Furthermore, protecting the right to speak anonymously does not 
extend only to defendants; third parties can also be insulated from being 
 
 
 62. See McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 97 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“While disclosure of the 
anonymous speakers’ identities may certainly be helpful to Plaintiff, the [c]ourt does not believe that 
this is the exceptional case where the compelling need for the discovery sought outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of the anonymous speakers.”). Also note “[t]he United States Supreme Court has 
consistently held that ‘an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment.’” Id. at 94 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (omissions in original)). 
 63. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 64. Id. at 234. 
 65. “Nine of the [ten anonymous] defendants were accused together of libel based on false and 
misleading Internet statements imputing dishonesty, fraud, improper professional conduct, and 
criminal activity to the plaintiff.” Id. at 235. Doe 6’s posting in particular accused Krinsky of engaging 
in lewd sexual acts with her co-workers, along with having “fat thighs, a fake medical degree . . . and 
poor feminine hygiene.” Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 245. While the case ended up in a California court because Yahoo is based in that state, 
the case began in Florida because the defendants were from there. Id. at 235. Libel occurs in Florida 
when “(1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with 
having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or 
disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Id. at 247 (quoting Richard v. Gray, 
62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953)). Krinsky argued “Doe 6 implied that she was dishonest by calling her a 
‘crook’ and asserted that she had a ‘fake medical degree,’ thereby accusing [her] of being dishonest or 
. . . engaging in conduct incompatible with her employment.” Id. Krinsky further argued Doe 6 
“subjected [Krinsky] to ridicule and disgrace and damaged her reputation by stating that she had ‘poor 
feminine hygiene.’” Id. 
 68. Id. at 245. 
 69. Id. at 248 (emphasis in original). 
 70. Id. at 250. 
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forced to comply with subpoenas from civil plaintiffs trying to gather 
information against their defendants.
71
 In McVicker v. King,
72
 the court 
reaffirmed that compelling the disclosure of a non-party is actually much 
harder than compelling the disclosure of a defendant
73
 by making the 
plaintiff pass a four-part test:  
“whether (1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in 
good faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information 
sought relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the identifying 
information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or 
defense, and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove 
that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source.”74  
The court held that forcing the website to disclose the identity of its 
bloggers was not warranted because the plaintiff failed to establish 
elements (3) and (4) of the test: relevancy and the blog being the only 
source where the plaintiff could get material information for his case.
75
 
C. Private Sector 
Without the protections provided by virtue of being a government 
employee, private sector employees and other litigants suffering adverse 
action due to their Internet postings try—usually unsuccessfully—to sue 
on discrimination and invasion of privacy claims.
76
 For instance, in 
Nguyen v. Starbucks,
77
 an employee claimed Starbucks fired her because 
 
 
 71. See McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 97 (W.D. Pa. 2010). In suing a city council for 
wrongful termination, the plaintiff wanted to subpoena a website that posted anonymous blogs 
discussing the activities of the city council. The plaintiff sought the names of the anonymous posters in 
his attempt to contradict the testimony of some of the defendant councilmembers. Id. at 93. 
 72. 266 F.R.D. 92 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
 73. Id. at 95 (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 
2001)). 
 74. 266 F.R.D. at 96–97 (quoting the test developed in Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. 
Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008)). 
 75. 266 F.R.D. at 97 (“Distilled to its essence, Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain the personally 
identifiable information of the anonymous internet [sic] speakers is a fishing expedition based on 
speculation that the anonymous bloggers will be able to impeach the deposition testimony of the 
[i]ndividual [d]efendants.”). 
 76. See Nguyen v. Starbucks Coffee Corp., Nos. CV 08-3354 CRB, CV 09-0047, 2009 WL 
4730899, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009), aff’d, 418 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2011) (Plaintiff sued 
employer for wrongfully terminating her because of her religion); Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 
91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 860–61 (Ct. App. 2009) (A college student sued a high school principal for 
invasion of privacy when he submitted her MySpace entry to a local newspaper for publication). 
 77. 2009 WL 4730899. 
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of the religious views she expressed on her MySpace page.
78
 But because 
the posting contained both religious speech and threats against her co-
workers,
79
 and Nguyen had engaged in other disturbing behavior at work,
80
 
the court granted Starbucks’ motion for summary judgment without much 
analysis—concluding Nguyen failed to offer any substantial support for 
her religious discrimination claim.
81
 Admittedly, this is a case where, 
regardless of the presence of the employee’s religious Internet speech, the 
employer was justified in terminating the employee. Nevertheless, the case 
also implies that as long as the employer has a valid reason to fire an 
employee, there are very few categories
82
 of Internet speech that will 
convince a court to rule against an employer in an Internet-speech related 
wrongful termination case. 
Moreno v. Handford Sentinel, Inc.,
83
 while not being a wrongful 
termination case, shows the limits of an Internet-related invasion of 
privacy claim. Here, a college student sued a high school principal for 
 
 
 78. After making what turned out to be frivolous religious discrimination and sexual harassment 
complaints against her co-workers to her manager, Nguyen took a leave of absence from Starbucks 
due to the mental and physical pain she claimed were brought on by her negative work environment. 
Id. at *1-2. A few weeks later, a co-worker showed an assistant manager Nguyen’s MySpace page, 
which Nguyen had consistently referenced during her employment. One of the postings on her 
MySpace page read:  
Starbucks is in deep shit with GOD!! I am now completely disenchanted with humans n I 
have NO MO Energy left 2 deal w/ their negativity. I’ve worked Tirelessly 2 not cause 
trouble, BUT I will now have 2 to turn 2 my revenge side (GOD’S REVENGE SIDE) 2 teach 
da world a lesson of stepping on GOD. I thank GOD 4 pot 2 calm down my frustrations n 
worries or else I will go beserk [sic] n shoot everyone . . . Prepare to See Crazy Trang [the 
Plaintiff] in public eye soon IN UR TELEVISION n other news vehicles. I don’t know when 
EXACTLY “cause only GOD knows of our Exact timing in his PERFECTED-CREATED 
NETWORK (fate!) BUT all I know is I will fight 2 be heard beyond my death.;) N I will not 
be happy unless I win because I AM GOD N GOD DON’T LOSE.  
Id. at *2 (omission in original). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Before taking her leave of absence, Nguyen would lash out at her colleagues when asked to 
perform job-related tasks. Nguyen aimed steam at a co-worker, almost burning him; asked customers 
questions about their national origin and religion, causing customers to complain; and informed a 
female co-worker how much money to charge for sexual acts should the co-worker ever become a 
prostitute. Id. at *1. Nguyen also wrote her boss a letter in support of her worker’s compensation 
claim, writing “she would ‘rather be saving da world via a pornstar instead of working as a barista’ and 
‘Bring out your best boys & whores because I’m really cute, HOT & HORNY! I [love] POT!!!.’” She 
also wrote ‘“God is here to save you . . . But 4 only da price of $250,000,000.”’ Id. at *2. 
 81. Id. at *3, *5. 
 82. See infra notes 109–11. If an employer discovers an employee’s Internet posting where the 
employee talks about his religion, sexual orientation, race, or other Title VII protected categories, and 
the employer subsequently fires the employee, the employee might be able to claim wrongful 
termination by arguing the employer fired the employee over one of the Title VII protected categories 
the employee discussed on his Internet posting. See Paul S. Gutman, Note, Say What?: Blogging and 
Employment Law in Conflict, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145, 184 (2003). 
 83. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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submitting one of her MySpace page postings to a local newspaper for 
publication.
84
 The MySpace posting contained several disparaging 
comments about the student’s hometown, where her family still lived.85 
Consequently, upon publication, the student’s family received death 
threats and was forced to move out of the town.
86
 However, the court 
refused to recognize Moreno’s invasion of privacy claim,87 ruling that 
information posted on MySpace cannot be considered private, and thus 
could not alone establish an invasion of privacy tort claim.
88
 Furthermore, 
the court declined to accept Moreno’s argument that her MySpace 
postings were private because they were intended for only a limited 
audience.
89
 It also rejected Moreno’s argument that because she did not 
post her last name on her MySpace page, her last name was a private fact 
that should not have been disclosed in the newspaper article about her 
posting.
90
  
 
 
 84. Moreno, a college student at the University of California at Berkeley, wrote the following on 
her MySpace page “[f]ollowing a visit to her hometown of Coalinga,” California: “‘the older I get, the 
more I realize how much I despise Coalinga,’ [followed by] a number of extremely negative comments 
about Coalinga and its inhabitants.” Id. at 861. Before Moreno removed the post six days after she put 
it on her MySpace page, the principal of Coalinga High School had seen the posting and submitted it 
to a local newspaper for publication. Id. The paper then published Moreno’s comments in the Letters 
to the Editor section, attributing them to Moreno using both her first and last names even though 
Moreno had not listed her last name on her MySpace page. Id. 
 85. Moreno’s parents and sister, who attended Coalinga High School at the time of the 
publication, still lived in Coalinga. Id. 
 86. “The community reacted violently to the publication of the [posting]. [The family] received 
death threats and a shot was fired at the family home, forcing the family to move out of Coalinga. Due 
to severe losses, [Moreno’s father] closed the 20-year-old family business.” Id. 
 87. Id. In California, “[t]o state a claim for violation of the constitutional right of privacy, a party 
must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.” Id. at 862 (citing Int’l Fed’n of Prof’l 
& Technical Eng’rs, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 488 (Cal. 2007)). Finding that 
Moreno was suing for public disclosure of private facts, the court stated the elements of that tort are: 
“‘(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the 
reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.’” 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862 (quoting 
Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)). The court further explained that all 
elements must be present to establish a claim. Id. 
 88. Id. Stating that “[a] matter that is already public or that has previously become part of the 
public domain is not private,” id. (citing Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 
1984)), the court concluded that by posting comments on “a hugely popular internet site,” Moreno 
“made her article available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye.” Id. 
Thus, “no reasonable person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the [MySpace] 
published material.” Id. 
 89. Id. at 863. While conceding that information disclosed to only a select group of people can 
still serve as the basis of an intrusion of privacy claim, the court determined that Moreno’s argument 
that she only wanted a few people to see her MySpace page still would not establish the privacy of her 
postings. Rather, “[b]y posting the article on myspace.com, [Moreno] opened the article to the public 
at large. Her potential audience was vast.” Id. 
 90. Id. While Moreno only listed her first name on her MySpace page, the court found the 
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Despite not being discussed in the opinion, the result of Moreno raises 
the question of whether the outcome would have differed if Moreno had 
placed privacy protections on her MySpace page.
91
 The court found it 
relevant that her postings were available to anyone with a computer,
92
 so 
perhaps Moreno’s “limited audience” argument would have held more 
weight if, for example, Moreno had chosen to only allow her MySpace 
“friends” to read her postings. Applying this rationale to the employment 
context, therefore, would indicate that a court might classify Internet 
speech that an employee had purposely prevented his or her employer 
from seeing as private. But to overcome the strength of the employment-
at-will doctrine, which usually leads courts to side with employers in 
wrongful termination cases,
93
 privacy suits typically have not proven to be 
 
 
presence of her picture on her page dispositive of her privacy claim. Stated otherwise, one could 
determine the identity of the author of the postings without knowing Moreno’s last name, thus 
rendering the information public. So “[i]n disclosing [Moreno’s] last name, [the principal] was merely 
giving further publicity to already public information,” which “does not provide a basis for the 
[invasion of privacy] tort.” Id. 
 91. “Myspace Members . . . can control how Visitors, other Members and Myspace communicate 
with them by controlling their account settings, available within the ‘Edit Profile’ portion of their 
Myspace profile.” Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last revised 
Dec. 7, 2010) (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). For example, a MySpace user can make his or her profile 
viewable by only the user’s “friends,” or other MySpace users the user has given permission to view 
his or her profile. MySpace Account Settings and Privacy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/my/ 
settings/account/privacy (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (MySpace users with active profiles can access 
this link to view the permissions granted to the user’s “friends”). 
 On the other hand, Facebook offers more options for users to control who views which portions of 
their profiles. For instance, users can limit who can look at their profiles, who can send them friend 
requests, who can post on their walls, and a host of other options to limit the audience of their profiles. 
Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/#!/settings/?tab=privacy (last visited on 
Jan. 2, 2012) (Facebook users with active profiles can access this link to view and change the privacy 
settings). Facebook users thus have the ability to limit their profiles and posts (including status 
updates, pictures, and wall posts) to friends, friends of friends, or a customized group of people of their 
choosing if they do not want all of their information to be available to the general Internet public. 
Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=120939471321735 (last 
visited on Jan. 2, 2012) (Facebook users with active profiles can access this link to review the 
Facebook Help Center). 
 92. See supra note 88. 
 93. See below: 
Private employees have little recourse if they are fired for what they write on blogs or social 
networking sites, because a private employer does not engage in state action. For instance, in 
2004 Delta Airlines fired a flight attendant for keeping a blog in which she posted 
provocative pictures of herself in her flight attendant uniform. 
Cydney A. Tune, Blogging and Social Networking: Current Legal Issues, in INFO. TECH. L. INST. 
2008: NEW DIRECTIONS: SOC. NETWORKS, BLOGS, PRIVACY, MASH-UPS, VIRTUAL WORLDS AND 
OPEN SOURCE, at 84 (PLI: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser., 
2008), available at WL 929 PLI/Pat 73. 
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the best vehicle.
94
 Thus, employees need a stronger cause of action to 
succeed in overcoming the employment-at-will doctrine in such cases. 
III. DESCRIPTIONS & CRITIQUES OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO 
RESOLVE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE INTERNET SPEECH DISPUTES 
A. Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes 
Concluding that “neither the currently enacted lifestyle discrimination 
statutes nor the judicially enforced public policy exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine adequately protect lawful off-duty activities, 
such as blogging and the speech that is associated with those blogging 
activities,”95 one law review note recommends that legislatures enact 
tougher lifestyle discrimination statutes to insulate at-will employees from 
being fired over blogging outside the office.
96
 Lifestyle discrimination 
statutes protect an employee’s right to engage in “lawful off-duty 
activity,” such as smoking, thus making it illegal for an employer to fire an 
employee for those activities.
97
 None of the current lifestyle discrimination 
statutes specifically shield blogging, but the note argues that such statutes 
are “the most likely source” of law to provide bloggers protection.98 
Therefore, the author proposes her own model lifestyle discrimination 
statute
99
 that prevents employers from firing employees for almost any off-
 
 
 94. See supra Part III.B.2; supra note 82. 
 95. Byers, supra note 12, at 247. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 266.  
Lifestyle discrimination statutes protect an employee’s use of lawful products or participation 
in lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech. Specifically, lifestyle discrimination statutes 
usually protect some form of lawful off-duty activity from intrusion by private sector 
employers. For instance, statutes in thirty states and the District of Columbia protect smokers, 
or others who use lawful consumable products from termination based solely on such 
activities.  
Id. (citing FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 425 (Karen E. Ford et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); Ann L. 
Rives, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Discrimination Legislation, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2006); and various state statutes). 
 98. Id. at 268. 
 99. See proposed statute below: 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for any employer to refuse to 
hire an applicant, demote, or to terminate the employment of any employee, or to fail or 
refuse to promote or upgrade an employee, due to that applicant’s or employee’s engaging in 
any lawful activity or conduct or speech associated with the protected activity or conduct 
when done off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a 
restriction:  
 (a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related 
to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular 
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duty employee speech, including blogging.
100
 
While the author proposes a strong method for strengthening lifestyle 
discrimination statutes to protect bloggers, her statute might actually 
exacerbate employer-employee conflict over Internet speech and leave 
employees even more unsure of what their employers think is permissible 
Internet activity. For example, the statute appears overbroad and vague 
because the terms “rationally related to the employment activities”101 and 
“conflict of interest with any responsibilities”102 could encompass almost 
any activity the employer finds objectionable. Consequently, employers 
could manipulate the statute in numerous ways to justify firing employees 
over any Internet speech, leaving employees with scant protection for their 
blogging and social networking activities. Moreover, while the author 
justifies her statute by arguing it simply models other state statutes passed 
to protect employees’ rights to engage in lawful off-duty conduct,103 the 
soundness of enacting such proposed legislation into law in the first place 
seems questionable upon consideration of how severely it could prevent 
employers from effectively managing their employees
104
 when 
implemented.
105
 
 
 
group of employees, rather than to all employees of the employer; or  
 (b) Is necessary to avoid a bona fide and actual conflict of interest with any 
responsibilities of the employer. 
Id. at 286 (emphasis in the original) (struck language omitted). Byers notes that this model statute is 
based upon a Colorado statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2001). Id. at 285. 
 100. Id. at 286. 
 101. See supra note 99. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Several states, including California, Colorado, and New York, have enacted statutes that 
prevent employers from firing employees for various off-duty activities. Id. at 269–74 (citing CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003), COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001), and N.Y. LAB. LAW 
§ 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002)). Connecticut’s Free Speech Act most explicitly prohibits employees 
from being fired for speech, “extend[ing] the same protection for free speech that the First Amendment 
gives public employees, with the exception that the speech is not protected if it substantially or 
materially interferes with the employee’s job.” Id. at 271–72 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q 
(2003) and Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private 
Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1581 (1998)). 
 104. Consider the following hypothetical. Such a statute appears to prevent an employer from 
firing his company’s accountant, who never interacted with customers or had any job responsibilities 
requiring him to deal with customers, for posting numerous pictures of his tattoos and piercings 
publicly, without any privacy controls, on Facebook. (Suppose the employer was worried about those 
pictures hurting his company’s reputation as a middle-class, suburban friendly business, even though 
the employer has no evidence that his business has been hurt thus far. Nevertheless, it does not sound 
completely irrational for the employer to think this might hurt his business, considering the clientele he 
is trying to target.) 
 105. Under Byers’ proposed statute, particularly § (1)(a), it would seem that the employer could 
not fire the accountant (discussed in the hypothetical in supra note 104) because maintaining the 
company’s public image probably would not be considered as “relat[ing] to a bona fide occupational 
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B. Disclaimers, Anonymity, & the Introduction of Blogging Guidelines in 
the Workplace 
Rather than depending on broad lifestyle discrimination statutes to 
protect almost all forms of employee Internet speech, employers and 
employees can take more discrete measures to resolve Internet speech 
conflicts at the office. For example, to prevent people from associating an 
employee’s non-work related blog or social networking site with his or her 
employer, the employee can place a disclaimer on the entrance to those 
web pages announcing that the following content does not reflect the 
employer’s views.106 Such disclaimers could insulate the employee from 
accusations that he is reflecting the employer in a bad light because the 
disclaimer explicitly dissolves the connection between the employee’s 
Internet speech and the employer.
107
 However, such disclaimers might 
actually cause, rather than prevent, problems between employee bloggers 
and their employers because the disclaimers might attract more, not less, 
attention to the fact that the blogger works for that particular employer.
108
 
As a result, disclaimers alone will not resolve the current employer-
employee Internet speech disputes. 
Alternatively, bloggers and social networkers could speak either 
anonymously or through aliases on the Internet to avoid employer 
 
 
requirement” of the accountant or as “reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities 
and responsibilities . . . of a particular employee [the accountant] . . . rather than to all employees of 
the employer.” See supra note 99. It is also questionable whether the employer could legally fire the 
accountant under § (1)(b) because to do so, the employer must prove that firing or reprimanding the 
accountant “[i]s necessary to avoid a bona fide and actual conflict of interest with any responsibilities 
of the employer.” Id. Stated otherwise, what may be considered a “conflict of interest” to the 
accountant’s employer (here, that the accountant’s Facebook postings undermine the employer’s desire 
for the company to have a middle-class family image) may not be considered as an “actual conflict of 
interest” by an outside court because, as discussed in supra note 104, the employer has no evidence 
that the accountant’s Facebook postings are driving away middle class clientele. The case would be 
even harder if the accountant could present evidence that he was an excellent employee with an 
outstanding reputation at the company. 
 106. Gutman, supra note 82, at 182–83. 
 107. Id. at 182. 
 108. Id. at 183.  
An author’s explicit disavowal that the blog does not reflect the views of his or her employer 
may increase the visibility of his complaints or concerns. In other words, a disclaimer may 
exacerbate an employer’s concerns about blogging and that particular employee since 
mentioning the employer’s name may cause the site to be increasingly indexed by search 
engines. 
Id. (citing Jeremy Wagstaff, Why Don’t You Get the Net?, FAR E. ECON. REV. 36 (Sept. 5, 2002) and 
Rick Klau, How I Learned to Love the Blog, LAW TECH. NEWS (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005532887 (the article appears in its full form on the Law Tech. 
News website archives—a free registration is required to view the article in full)).  
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repercussions over their speech. Bloggers could therefore have an invasion 
of privacy claim against employers who fire them over their Internet 
speech if the blogger does not explicitly identify himself or his 
employer.
109
 However, much of this cause of action will be tied to whether 
(1) the employer discovers certain personal characteristics of the 
blogger—such as an employee’s sexual orientation or national origin—
and (2) the employee can prove a wrongful termination via discrimination 
charge against his employer by linking the employer’s discovery of those 
personal characteristics through the employee’s website to his firing.110 
Accordingly, only a narrow subset of bloggers and social networkers will 
be able to make these invasion of privacy claims against their 
employers,
111
 leaving the majority of employees fired for Internet speech 
without redress. 
Finally, companies could attempt to confront the problem head-on by 
establishing company blogging and social networking guidelines for their 
employees.
112
 Such companies could even go a step further by 
encouraging their employees to blog and communicate on social 
networking sites to foster creativity and insight.
113
 But since many 
employers do not want to deal with the hassle of determining for their 
employees what is and is not an appropriate use of blogging and social 
networking sites, many just have blanket bans on various forms of Internet 
speech.
114
 Furthermore, current employer liability schemes may actually 
punish employers who have blogging and social networks policies more 
than those who do not.
115
 These types of employers are unlikely to see 
 
 
 109. Id. at 184. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 183–84. 
 112. Id. at 184–85. 
 113. Id. at 185. 
 114. For example, “ESPN recently issued 12 guidelines to its employees prohibiting some forms 
of social networking. On-air talent, reporters, and writers cannot have sports-related blogs or websites, 
and are required to obtain permission to discuss sports on any social networking site.” Lori E. Lesser, 
Social Networks and Blogs, in INFO. TECH. L. INST. 2010: OPPORTUNITIES IN CLOUD COMPUTING, 
BLOGS, BRAND PROTECTION AND TARGETED MARKETING, at 158 (PLI: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SER., 2010), available at WL 1001 PLI/Pat 
101 (citing Richard Sandomir, ESPN Limits Social Networking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/sports/05espn.html). 
 115. See below: 
Current labor law leaves substantial uncertainty as to whether employers should create an 
employee blogging policy. The law states that an employer is liable for employee conduct if 
the conduct is within the scope of employment. Thus, a company without a formal blogging 
policy appears to have less to worry about, because that company is not explicitly 
encouraging blogging activity. The company could argue that any employee blogging activity 
was not within the scope of employment. Just as the company should not be liable for an e-
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blogging and social networking as anything more than a nuisance to the 
company’s well-being; therefore, this solution also fails to find a happy 
medium between banning all employee Internet speech and completely 
preventing employers from being able to effectively manage their 
employees. 
C. Decreasing An Employer’s Liability for the Internet Speech of Its 
Employees 
Passing legislation to decrease or to eliminate an employer’s liability 
for unlawful comments made by its employees represents another 
alternative solution to employer-employee Internet speech disputes. 
Hence, another law review note suggests that making employers less liable 
for harmful comments their employees post on their personal blogs might 
alleviate the problems of employee Internet speech.
116
 Employers, under 
this model, should not be held vicariously liable for any speech torts, such 
as libel or defamation, employees commit through their personal social 
networking or blogging sites.
117
 The note thus proposes that courts 
encourage employers to draw up blogging policies and develop a more 
nuanced employer liability scheme than one resulting solely in strict 
liability for the employer.
118
 Nonetheless, it might be unreasonable to 
expect employers to draw up blogging guidelines for the reasons 
previously mentioned: spotlighting blogging in this way might actually 
subject the employer to even more litigation than before the blogging 
guidelines were put into place.
119
 Furthermore, it is unknown whether 
courts would embrace this more tiered level of employer liability,
120
 
 
 
mail sent by a malicious employee, it should not be liable for unauthorized activity beyond its 
control.  
Henry Hoang Pham, Note, Bloggers and the Workplace: The Search for a Legal Solution to the 
Conflict Between Employee Blogging and Employers, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 207, 228 (2006) 
(citations omitted). 
 116. Id. at 232–33. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 233. For example, the employer, rather than being strictly liable for the employee’s 
blog, could develop an affirmative defense if “(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
illegal activity; and (2) the claimant failed to take advantage of available procedures of the employer 
that could have reasonably avoided harm.” Id. 
 119. See supra note 108. 
 120. “Generally, courts will find vicarious liability for defamatory statements posted by an 
employee if the ‘defamation is referable to the duty owing by the agent to the corporation and was 
made in the discharge of that duty.’” Pham, supra note 115, at 225 (quoting Mars, Inc. v. Gonazalez, 
71 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 2002)). Additionally,  
[c]ourts have further extended liability to employee conduct that takes place outside of the 
company’s location or facilities. In Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the court held that a 
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regardless of the guidelines employers adopt to encourage a more nuanced 
view of employer liability for employee Internet speech. 
IV. A FRESH APPROACH TO A GROWING PROBLEM: THE STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT & CASES INTERPRETING IT 
A. The SCA 
Enacted in 1986, the SCA’s meaning has confounded the legal 
community since it was first introduced.
121
 Its general purpose, however, is 
somewhat clearer: it “offer[s] network account holders a range of statutory 
privacy rights against access to stored account information held by 
network service providers,”122 especially against unwarranted access by 
the government.
123
 Congress’s concern for protecting privacy and civil 
liberties
124
 further suggests Congress wanted to protect as much private 
Internet material as possible from unauthorized access through the SCA. 
To achieve this goal, Congress chose to regulate both electronic 
 
 
company may be held liable for posting harassing statements on an electronic bulletin board, 
even when the board is not hosted by the company, when the company “knows or has reason 
to know that such harassment . . . is taking place in the workplace.” . . . Accordingly, 
companies may be held liable for harassment that takes place both in the workplace and in 
“settings that are related to the workplace.” 
Id. at 226 (citing Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 552 (N.J. 2000)). 
 121. Kerr, supra note 19, at 1208 (citing Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: 
How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820–21 
(2003)). This confusion has been exacerbated by the fact that, “[d]espite the rapid evolution of 
computer and networking technology since the SCA’s adoption [in 1986], its language has remained 
surprisingly static . . . [with the] resulting task of adapting the Act’s language to modern technology 
[falling] largely upon the courts.” Robison, supra note 7, at 1196. 
 122. Kerr, supra note 19, at 1212.  
 123. Id. See infra note 199. 
 124. “[The] Congress [enacting the SCA] notes its explicit reliance on a report from the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) prepared in 1985 to review the potential threats to civil liberties 
resulting from new or emerging technologies.” Robison, supra note 7, at 1205 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
99-647, at 18 (1986); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. Cong., OTA-CIT-293, FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(1985)). See also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (E.D. Va. 
2008) (“Protecting privacy interests in personal information stored in computerized systems, while 
also protecting the Government’s legitimate law enforcement needs, the [Electronic Communications] 
Privacy Act [18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03, which contains the SCA] creates a zone of privacy to protect 
internet [sic] subscribers from having their personal information wrongfully used and publicly 
disclosed by ‘unauthorized private parties.’” (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541 at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557)); see also AOL, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (“[T]he Privacy Act protects 
users whose electronic communications are stored with an internet [sic] service provider and reflects 
Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of communications 
stored at such a facility.” (citing Theofel v. Farey Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
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communication services (ECS),
125
 which transmit electronic materials 
such as email, and remote computing services (RCS),
126
 which simply 
provide data storage rather than electronic communication like email.
127
 
Although distinguishing between an ECS and a RCS can be difficult, 
recent case law has classified social networking sites like Facebook and 
MySpace as ECS with RCS capabilities.
128
  
While the legislative history of the SCA implies websites configured to 
be private—and thus not accessible to the general public—are to receive 
the most privacy protection under the SCA,
129
 much of the litigation over 
the SCA’s application to Internet communication stems from whether 
§ 2701(c)(2)’s exceptions from SCA liability apply in a particular 
situation. These exemptions provide that if access to the Internet 
communication resulted from “conduct authorized . . . by a user of that 
service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user,”130 
then plaintiffs suing others for allegedly “unauthorized” access will no 
 
 
 125. An ECS is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C § 2510(15) (2006).  
 126. “[T]he term ‘remote computing service’ means the provision to the public of computer 
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” § 2711(2). See also 
§ 2510(14) (“‘electronic communications system’ means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, 
and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such 
communications.”). 
 127. Robison, supra note 7, at 1205. 
 128. “[A] harmonized reading of Konop, Theofel and Quon leads to the conclusion that Facebook 
and MySpace are ECS providers as respects wall postings and comments and that such 
communications are in electronic storage.” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 
989 (C.D. Cal. 2010). “In the alternative, the court holds that the Facebook and MySpace are RCS 
providers as respects the wall postings and comments.” Id. at 990. The Crispin court explained the 
RCS analysis by analogizing the Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments to videos posted by 
users on YouTube, which Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.YouTube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) found 
YouTube to be “an RCS provider because it provided storage services for the user, i.e., it stored the 
video on a web page for the benefit of the user and those the user designates.” Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
at 990. 
 129. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
99-541, at 35–36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3559 (“This provision [the Stored 
Communications Act] addresses the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining 
access to . . . electronic or wire communications that are not intended to be available to the public.” 
(omission in original))). See also id. (“describ[ing] the [House] Committee’s understanding that the 
configuration of the electronic communications system would determine whether or not an electronic 
communication was readily accessible to the public”) (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 41, 62–63 
(1986)). 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2006). In other words, social networkers and bloggers cannot use the 
SCA against anyone they gave permission to view the content of their social network or blog website, 
even if that authorized person shows the content to an unauthorized person. Cf. Konop, 302 F.3d at 
880; Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 
2009); infra notes 174, 180–82 and accompanying text. 
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longer have a cause of action under the SCA. The following cases attempt 
to establish when and how that exception applies. 
B. Cases Interpreting the SCA 
In Devine v. Kapasi,
131
 Devine sued his former business partner under 
the SCA
132
 for illegally accessing a password-protected server both 
partners had access to until Devine gained sole ownership over the 
server.
133
 Devine’s ex-partner used his old password to access the server, 
which was now part of Devine’s solo company, Devine Solutions,134 and 
deleted and transferred electronic files on the server after the ownership of 
the server was transferred exclusively to Devine.
135
 Devine claimed that 
his server was an ECS,
136
 and thus protected by the SCA, because the 
server “provide[d] authorized users with the ability to transmit and receive 
electronic communications by on-site or remote access, through password 
protected accounts—including . . . the ability to send and receive e-
mail.”137 The defendant moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that he did 
not violate the SCA because the SCA only prevents unauthorized access to 
ECSs,
138
 and the server could not be described as such a service.
139
  
 
 
 131. 729 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 132. See below: 
[A]ny “aggrieved” party may bring a civil action against a defendant who “intentionally 
accesses without authorization” or “intentionally exceeds an authorization to access” a 
“facility through which an electronic communications service is provided . . . and thereby 
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is 
in electronic storage in such system.”  
Id. at 1026 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (the SCA)) (omission in original). 
 133. Id. at 1025.  
 134. Id. Devine Solutions “comprises computers, servers, and remote access equipment secured 
by password-protected accounts.” Id. 
 135. Id. at 1026. After the server was transferred solely to Devine, his “investigation . . . revealed 
that . . . more than 2000 files and 350 file folders containing electronically stored information and 
communications were deleted or otherwise transferred from the Devine Solutions network—but not by 
Devine or anyone working under his direction.” Id.  
 136. The SCA applies to an electronic communications service, which is “‘any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.’” Id. 
(quoting § 2510(15), (12) and citing § 2711). 
 137. Id. at 1027. 
 138. Id. See supra note 136 for ECS definition.  
 139. The defendant claimed the server was not an ECS because it did not provide “an electronic 
communication service to the public.” Id. He arrived at this conclusion because Devine Solutions, and 
thus the server, “merely provides . . . technological support for its customers . . . as opposed to . . . 
‘independently’ providing internet [sic] services to their customers.’” Id. To make this argument, the 
defense relied on Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998), which held 
that the unauthorized disclosure of emails found in a company’s internal email service did not violate 
the SCA. Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1027. Andersen had sued UOP for providing the Wall Street 
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Ruling that the server was an ECS, the court held a claim arises under 
§ 2701 of the SCA when, “as here, a plaintiff pleads that it stores 
electronic communications on its own systems, and that a defendant 
intentionally and without authorization got hold of those stored 
communications through the plaintiff’s electronic facilities.”140 Stated 
otherwise, the court noted that § 2701 does not state that a company must 
provide an ECS to the public to be covered under § 2701.
141
 Rather, the 
court observed that “no court of appeals has held that § 2701 applies only 
where the plaintiff is ‘in the business’ of providing an electronic 
communication service ‘to the public.’”142 
The defendants in Kaufman v. Nest Seekers, LLC,
143
 made a similar 
argument, claiming the plaintiff did not have a cause of action under the 
SCA because the plaintiff’s website, a password-protected electronic 
bulletin board,
144
 was not an electronic service provider and rather “simply 
a database website that limits access and affords subscribers a place to 
store information on the Website’s server.”145 Yet once again, the court 
here denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s SCA claim.146 
It determined the website was an electronic service provider qualifying for 
SCA protection because (1) only paying subscribers, rather than the 
 
 
Journal with emails written by Andersen employees, claiming such conduct violated § 2702 of the 
SCA: “a person or entity providing an electronic communications service to the public shall not 
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage 
by that service.” Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006)) (emphasis 
in the original). But because the company’s internal email service “did not ‘provide . . . an electronic 
communication service to the public’” and UOP “was not ‘in the business of providing electronic 
communications services,’” the court dismissed the SCA claim. Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 
(quoting Andersen Consulting, 991 F. Supp at 1043). 
 140. Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (citing Expert Janitorial, LLC v. Williams, 2010 WL 
908740, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2010)). 
 141. Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1027–28. While a § 2702 wrongful disclosure claim does require 
that an ECS be provided to the public, see supra note 139, and was dispositive of the plaintiff’s § 2702 
claim in Andersen Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043, this requirement does not bleed over into a 
§ 2701 unauthorized access claim. See supra note 132. 
 142. Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1028. However, the court concedes that “there is some 
disagreement within and between the district courts as to whether § 2701 can apply to a private 
employer that is not ‘in the business’ of providing an electronic communication service ‘to the 
public.’” Id. (citing several conflicting district court opinions on the matter). 
 143. No. 05 CV 6782(GBD), 2006 WL 2807177 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 144. Id. at *1 (citing Compl. ¶ 22 (“Each . . . subscriber is assigned a non-sharable private member 
name and password which is used to login to access each subscriber’s personal, private, and 
confidential account”)). 
 145. Id. at *3. Additionally, an electronic—or computer—bulletin board “‘is a computer program 
that simulates an actual bulletin board by allowing computer users who access a particular computer 
[or in the current era, a particular website] to post messages, read existing messages, and delete 
messages.’” Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 417 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). 
 146. Id. at *6. 
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general public, could access the website, (2) the website’s users—mostly 
real estate professionals—could send listings through the website to 
customers and colleagues, and (3) users could also send emails directly to 
other users through the website.
147
 Moreover, the court emphasized that in 
order for an electronic bulletin board to be protected under the SCA, its 
owner must limit access to the bulletin board to a select group of people. 
Consequently, such websites available to the public at-large would not 
merit SCA protection.
148
 
Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
149
 similarly followed the 
rationale of Devine and Kaufman by holding Viacom could not gain access 
to YouTube user videos the users had designated as private, thereby 
restricting access by the general public.
150
 Viacom wanted access to these 
private videos as part of its lawsuit against YouTube for posting, and 
allowing others to post, copyrighted material on the YouTube website 
without Viacom’s permission.151 In ruling for YouTube, the court noted 
that nothing in the SCA “can fairly be construed as a grant of permission 
from users to reveal to [Viacom] the videos that they have designated as 
private and chosen to share only with specified recipients.”152 
However, Snow v. DirecTV, Inc.,
153
 reverses the trend of the previous 
cases: it struck down a website owner’s SCA claim against a group of 
people who accessed his site,
154
 even though they were explicitly 
prohibited from entering the site.
155
 The court reasoned that if a person 
 
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at *5 (citing Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006)). That case found that 
an “Internet website which operated an electronic bulletin board was not protected under the Stored 
Communications Act because it was not configured in some way so as to limit access by the general 
public.” Id. (describing Snow’s holding). 
 149. 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 150. Id. at 264–65.  
YouTube.com users may override the website’s default setting—which makes newly added 
videos available to the public—by electing to mark as “private” the videos they post to the 
website. Plaintiffs [Viacom] move to compel production of copies of all those private videos, 
which can only be viewed by others authorized by the user who posted each of them . . . . 
Id. at 264. 
 151. Id. at 262–63, 264–65. 
 152. Id. at 265. 
 153. 450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 154. The plaintiff created a website “as a ‘private support group’ website for ‘individuals who 
have been, are being, or will be sued by any Corporate entity.’” Id. at 1316. The plaintiff claimed 
several DirecTV employees, explicitly prohibited from accessing the site, entered the website in 
violation of the SCA. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1319 (striking down the plaintiff’s SCA claim). The plaintiff argued defendant 
DirecTV violated the SCA by accessing his electronic bulletin board website because its homepage 
“expressly forbids access by DIRECTV and its agents.” Id. at 1316. Furthermore, a person must affirm 
that he is not affiliated with DirecTV by clicking “I Agree to these terms” before he “may enter into, 
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who “ignor[es] an express warning, on an otherwise publicly accessible 
webpage” is ruled to have violated the SCA, the frequency of SCA 
litigation would unnecessarily increase and “the merely curious would be 
prosecuted.”156 The court arrived at this conclusion by looking at the text 
of the SCA, § 2511(2)(g), which states, “It shall not be unlawful . . . for 
any person—(i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made 
through an electronic communication system that is configured so that 
such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general 
public.”157 
While Snow could be read as merely an outlier case not in line with 
mainstream reasoning on this issue, it actually fits in well with Devine, 
Kaufman, and Viacom when one considers each case’s suggestions about 
the proportional relationship between the strength of a website’s privacy 
settings and the amount of protection a website receives under the SCA. In 
Devine and Kaufman, only users with user names and passwords approved 
by the companies owning the respective websites could access the sites.
158
 
Similarly, in Viacom, only YouTube users who had received explicit 
permission from the owner of videos labeled “private” could see such 
videos.
159
 Yet in Snow, the court emphasized that potential users could 
access the website by registering under any name and creating any 
password—without approval of the website’s owner—as long as they 
checked the box agreeing they were not associated with DirecTV.
160
 The 
court thus distinguished Snow from Konop, to be discussed infra, by 
pointing out “Konop’s website . . . required users wishing to view the 
[website’s] contents to have knowledge (an eligible employee’s name) that 
was not publicly available,” whereas Snow’s website did not require users 
to possess such “private” information to gain access to his website.161  
Consequently, these four cases establish that in order for a plaintiff to 
successfully make an SCA claim against a person accessing his or her 
website without authorization, he must ensure that the website is truly 
“private.” In other words, a website owner making an SCA claim must 
ensure that users can only access the site upon receiving access 
 
 
view, and participate in the electronic bulletin board.” Id. Conversely, a person who clicks “I do not 
agree to these terms” cannot enter the site. Id.  
 156. Id. at 1321. 
 157. Id. at 1320 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (2006)) (emphasis in the original). 
 158. See Devine, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1025; Kaufman, 2006 WL 2807177 at *6.  
 159. See Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 264–65.  
 160. Snow, 450 F.3d at 1322. 
 161. Id. 
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information or approval from the owner or poster that is not available to 
the general public.  
V. APPLYING THE SCA TO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE INTERNET SPEECH 
DISPUTES: KONOP & PIETRYLO 
In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
162
 an airline pilot sued his 
supervisors under the SCA, alleging they had looked at his password-
protected website without authorization and divulged information found 
on the website to others.
163
 Konop’s website required people to enter a 
user name and password before they could gain entry to the contents of the 
site.
164
 After creating an exclusive list, predominated by fellow Hawaiian 
Airlines employees, of those who could enter the site, Konop let people on 
that list enter the site by entering their pre-approved names and creating 
passwords.
165
 Upon gaining access to the site after clicking the “SUBMIT” 
button, the user also implicitly agreed to the website’s terms of use, 
prohibiting “any member of Hawaiian’s management from viewing the 
website and prohibited users from disclosing the website’s contents to 
anyone else.”166 A vice president of Hawaiian Airlines, a member of the 
management group explicitly prohibited from viewing the website under 
its terms of use, asked a pre-approved employee—who had never 
personally logged on to Konop’s website—if he could use the employee’s 
name to access Konop’s website.167 The vice president explained to the 
employee that he wanted to see Konop’s website because “he was 
concerned about untruthful allegations that he believed Konop was making 
on the website.”168 The employee agreed, and the vice president used the 
employee’s name to access the website several times.169  
Upon finding that no violation of the SCA occurs if an authorized user, 
such as the pre-approved employee, facilitates access for a non-authorized 
user, like the vice president,
170
 the district court granted Hawaiian 
 
 
 162. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 163. Id. at 872–73.  
 164. Id. at 872. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 872–73. 
 167. Id. at 873. 
 168. Id. Despite the management’s concern about the comments Konop made on his website, the 
case does not mention any adverse employment action taken against Konop for those comments. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. See Below: 
The SCA makes it an offense to “intentionally access[] without authorization a facility 
through which an electronic communication service is provided . . . and thereby obtain[] . . . 
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Airlines’ motion for summary judgment on the SCA claim.171 Yet the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that because one of the employees who 
provided the vice president access to Konop’s website was not a “user” as 
defined by the SCA, that employee did not have the legal authority to 
grant the vice president authorized access; therefore, the SCA’s liability 
exception was inapplicable.
172
 Since “§ 2701(c)(2) allows a person to 
authorize a third party’s access to an electronic communication if the 
person is (1) a ‘user’ of the ‘service’ and (2) the communication is ‘of or 
intended for that user,’” the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a non-“user” 
cannot grant access to a third party under the SCA.
173
 Stated otherwise, an 
employee who, despite being authorized to use Konop’s site, never 
actually logged on to and used the website, is not considered a “user” of 
the website. Thus, since one must first be a “user” to satisfy the first prong 
of the § 2701(c)(2) SCA liability exception, the employee does not qualify 
and therefore could not grant access to the vice president without violating 
the SCA.
174
 
By negative implication, Konop suggests that an employer not granted 
authorized access to an employee’s website can still view the website and 
avoid SCA liability by having another employee (1) with authorized 
access and (2) who actually views/uses the website show the employer the 
 
 
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such a 
system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1). The SCA excepts from liability, however, “conduct 
authorized . . . by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for 
that user.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2). The district court found that the exception in § 2701(c)(2) 
applied because [the employees] consented to [the vice president’s] use of Konop’s website. 
It therefore granted summary judgment to Hawaiian on the SCA claim. 
Id. at 879 (citing various parts of § 2701) (omissions in original). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 880. 
 173. “A ‘user’ is ‘any person or entity who—(A) uses an electronic communications service; and 
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use.’” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(13) (2006)). 
 174. Id. at 880. The Ninth Circuit conceded that legislative history reveals that “Congress believed 
‘addressees’ or ‘intended recipients’ of electronic communications would have the authority under the 
SCA to allow third parties access to those communications.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66–
67 “(explaining that ‘an addressee [of an electronic communication] may consent to the disclosure of a 
communication to any other person’ and that ‘[a] person may be an ‘intended recipient’ of a 
communication . . . even if he is not individually identified by name or otherwise’)” (alterations in 
original)). However, the Ninth Circuit declined to classify the employee as a “user” because it could 
not find any evidence that the employee ever logged on to Konop’s website. Id. Furthermore, it 
criticized the district court for not even investigating whether the employee used the website: the 
district court “simply assumed that [the employee], by virtue of being eligible to view the website, 
could authorize [the vice president’s] access.” Id. The Ninth Circuit took issue with this analysis 
because “it essentially reads the ‘user’ requirement out of § 2701(c)(2)” and contradicts the statute’s 
plain language utilization of “use,” which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “‘to put into action or 
service, avail oneself of, employ.’” Id. (citing Webster’s at 1299). 
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website.
175
 However, when a district court in New Jersey faced this exact 
situation, it still struck down an employer’s motion for summary judgment 
and found that the plaintiff-employee could have a viable SCA claim 
against the employer.
176
 In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group,
177
 an 
employee sued his managers under the SCA alleging that they “accessed 
the Spec-Tator (a chat group [run by the employee] on MySpace.com, 
accessed by invitation and then the members’ MySpace accounts and 
passwords) without authorization on five occasions.”178 The managers 
claimed their access was authorized because an authorized user—a fellow 
restaurant employee—both showed the website to the managers and 
provided them with her MySpace log-in information to access the 
employee’s MySpace.com chat group.179  
Nevertheless, the court denied, as a matter of law, the manager-
defendants’ motion for judgment, determining that a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that the pressured employee who provided her log-
in information to the managers never really “authorized” them to access 
the private site and that the website owner had a viable SCA claim against 
the managers.
180
 The court arrived at this conclusion by finding that a 
“jury could reasonably infer from [the testimony of the employee who 
provided the managers with the log-in information that her] purported 
‘authorization’ was coerced or provided under pressure,” thus nullifying 
any authorization she gave to the mangers to view the website.
181
 The 
court also found harmful to the defense the fact that the managers knew 
access to the website was by invitation only,
182
 and that the managers 
 
 
 175. Konop, 302 F.3d at 879 (citing various parts of § 2701), 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) 
(2006)), 880 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66–67). 
 176. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 
25, 2009). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *1. The court noted that the plaintiffs were fired from the restaurant, although it is 
unclear as to why. Id. at *4. However, the terminations were a factor in the court upholding the 
compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiffs by the jury. Id. at *4–5. 
 179. Id. at *3. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. The employee:  
testified that she felt she had to give her password to [her manager] because she worked at 
[the restaurant] and for [that particular manager]. She further testified that she would not have 
given [her manager] her password if he had not been a manager, and that she would not have 
given her information to other co-workers. Furthermore, when she asked whether she felt that 
something would happen to her if she did not give [her manager] her password, she answered, 
“I felt that I probably would have gotten in trouble.” 
Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings at 94–96, Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06-5754 
(FSH) (June 10, 2009) (June 10 Transcript)). 
 182. The court found that “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that these repeated visits to the 
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continued to visit the website even after the pressured employee expressed 
concern over giving them access to the website.
183
 
Combining the holdings of Konop and Pietrylo, therefore, leads to the 
following conclusions about employer liability under the SCA: if the 
employer either (1) gains unauthorized access to the employee’s 
password-protected blog or social networking website,
184
 or (2) coerces an 
authorized user of the employee’s password-protected blog or social 
networking website to either (a) give the employer log-in information for 
the employee’s private site or (b) show the employer the employee’s 
private site,
185
 the employer most likely has violated the SCA. Conversely, 
an employer can most likely avoid SCA liability if he or she accesses an 
employee’s website (1) that is available to the general public,186 (2) 
because the employee gives the employer authorized access to view the 
website,
187
 (3) because an authorized co-worker voluntarily provides his or 
her log-in information to the employer so the employer could personally 
 
 
Spec-Tator were intentional or purposeful, as opposed to accidental, and that [the] managers knew that 
they were not authorized to access the contents of the Spec-Tator.” Id. at *3. The “managers accessed 
the Spec-Tator on several different occasions, even though it was clear on the website that the Spec-
Tator was intended to be private and only accessible to invited members.” Id. 
 183. The managers continued to visit the site, even after they realized that the employee “had 
reservations about having provided her log-in information.” Id. One of the managers testified he knew 
the employee “‘was very uneasy with the fact that she had given me and the rest of the managers her 
password,’ and that she was worried about the consequences of having provided such information.” Id. 
 184. For Konop’s description of what constitutes unauthorized access, see Konop, 302 F.3d at 879 
(citing various parts of § 2701), 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) (2006)), 880 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
99-647, at 66–67). 
 185. See Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420 at *3 (Pietrylo’s explanation of how coerced authorization is 
not authorization for the purposes of the SCA’s liability exception). 
 186. See Nguyen, 2009 WL 4730899 at *1–2, discussing how the website in Nguyen appeared to 
be available to the general public. There was no mention in the case of any privacy settings Nguyen 
put on her MySpace page, and Nguyen made it well known to her co-workers that she had a MySpace 
page. Id. 
 187. For example, if the employees in Konop and Pietrylo had invited their employers to view 
their websites, they would have granted authorized access to their employers and would have no claim 
against them under the SCA. Additionally, this logic could be extended to deny an employee an SCA 
claim against an employer who took adverse action against the employee for information the employer 
saw on the employee’s Facebook or MySpace page by virtue of being the employee’s “friend” on 
those websites. Stated otherwise, a court could look at Konop and Pietrylo and conclude that by 
“friending” his employer on MySpace or Facebook, the employee granted his employer authorized 
access to view his MySpace or Facebook page. At this juncture, perhaps the only way an employee 
could still have an SCA claim against an employer the employee “friended” would be if the employee 
only granted limited access to his “friend”-employer. Thus, if an employee (1) placed privacy settings 
on his social networking website, meaning only “friends” could view every section of the site, and (2) 
the employee only granted the employer authorized access to view, for example, his profile 
information and not any blog entries written on the site, an employer-“friend” who somehow managed 
to gain access to an unauthorized section of the employee’s page might still have violated the SCA. 
This idea will be fleshed out further in this Note’s discussion of Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. 
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view the website,
188
 or (4) because an authorized co-worker voluntarily 
shows the employer the website.
189
 
This logic seems to be predictive of how disputes arising out of 
password-protected blogs either existing as separate websites or found 
within social networking sites will be decided. Very few courts, however, 
have ruled on whether other unique features found within social 
networking sites—such as wall posts, status updates, notes, pictures, 
etc.
190—could also be protected against employer intrusion under the SCA. 
While Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,
191
 discusses discovery requests 
rather than a wrongful termination Internet speech claim, its determination 
that the SCA might cover Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments
192
 
indicates a possible extension of SCA coverage beyond password-
protected blogs to Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments made by 
users with privacy settings placed on their profiles.  
VI. CRISPIN: POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF KONOP & PIETRYLO BEYOND 
BLOGS TO FACEBOOK WALL POSTS & MYSPACE COMMENTS 
The Crispin defendants subpoenaed information located on the 
plaintiff’s MySpace and Facebook pages to gather information for their 
 
 
 188. See supra notes 170, 173, 174, and 181–84. If the Konop-authorized employee had actually 
used the website, and qualified as a user under the SCA, he could have granted authorized access to 
the employer and the website owner would not have a SCA claim against the employer. See Konop, 
302 F.3d at 879 (citing various parts of § 2701), 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) (2006)), 880 (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66–67). Similarly, had the Pietrylo employee given the employer her log-in 
information voluntarily, rather than out of fear of being reprimanded, she could have granted 
authorized access to the employer and the website owner would not have a SCA claim against the 
employer. See Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420 at *3. 
 189. If the Pietrylo employee had voluntarily shown the employer the website, the website owner 
would not have an SCA claim against the employer. See Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420 at *3. Had an 
SCA claim arisen in Nguyen, see Nguyen, 2009 WL 4730899 at *1-2, the fact that an authorized co-
worker voluntarily showed the employer Nguyen’s MySpace page would also prevent Nguyen from 
making such a claim. Id. Likewise, the plaintiff in Synder would not have a SCA claim against her 
employer because an authorized user voluntarily showed the plaintiff’s employer the plaintiff’s 
MySpace page. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
 190. Social networking sites like Facebook allow users to post status updates (basically a sentence 
or two describing what the user is doing or how the user is feeling at a particular moment), wall posts 
(short messages users write on other users’ “walls” that are typically visible to all the user’s friends, 
thus distinguishing wall-posts from “private messages,” which only the intended recipient can view), 
and notes (basically journal-like entries written by the user that are typically visible to the user’s 
friends). See generally Facebook’s “About” Page, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/face 
book?sk=info (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 191. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 192. Id. at 991. 
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copyright infringement lawsuit.
193
 This information included private 
messages sent via Facebook and MySpace,
194
 Facebook wall postings, and 
MySpace comments.
195
 The plaintiff sought to quash the subpoena, 
arguing the SCA prohibited Facebook and MySpace from disclosing any 
of the plaintiff’s information to the defendants without the plaintiff’s 
permission.
196
 The defendant argued that he should at least be able to 
subpoena the Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments because 
they generally can be seen by anyone with an account to Facebook or 
MySpace and “access to the user’s profile page”; stated otherwise, he 
claimed such communications are not private and thus fall outside the 
scope of the SCA’s protections.197 
On the subpoena issue, the court held (1) private messages and 
webmail “are inherently private such that stored messages are not readily 
accessible to the general public,” thus meriting SCA protection, and (2) 
that, regarding the Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, the 
case should be remanded back to the magistrate judge “to develop a fuller 
evidentiary record regarding [the] plaintiff’s privacy settings and the 
extent of access allowed to his Facebook wall and MySpace comments.”198 
The court thus determined that the SCA’s overall purpose199 prevents the 
disclosure of not only private Facebook and MySpace messages, but also 
Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments if the plaintiff placed 
privacy settings on his social networking pages to prevent the general 
public from viewing those wall postings and comments.
200
 
 
 
 193. Id. at 968–69. 
 194. Id. at 976 (citations omitted) (“Facebook and MySpace, Inc., are companies which provide 
social networking websites that allow users to send and receive messages . . . through private 
messaging services”). In other words, Facebook and MySpace private messages are similar to email 
Webmail services like Gmail or Yahoo. 
 195. Id. at 991. 
 196. Id. at 969. 
 197. Id. at 976–77. 
 198. Id. at 991. 
 199. See below: 
The SCA prevents “providers” of communication services from divulging private 
communications to certain entities and individuals. . . . It “creates a set of Fourth 
Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the relationship between 
government investigators and service providers in possession of users’ private information.” 
. . . First, the statute limits the government’s right to compel providers to disclose information 
in their possession about their customers and subscribers. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. “Although the 
Fourth Amendment may require no more than a subpoena to obtain e-mails, the statute 
[§ 2703] confers greater privacy protection.” . . . Second, the statute limits the rights of an 
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to disclose information about customers and subscribers to 
the government voluntarily. 18. U.S.C. § 2702. 
Id. at 971–72 (quoting Kerr, supra note 19, at 1212–13). 
 200. Id. at 991. 
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The court arrived at these conclusions by first noting that prior judicial 
decisions analyzing the legislative history of the SCA
201
 support the 
conclusion that all email-like functions, even those done through social 
networking sites like MySpace and Facebook, are subject to the 
restrictions of the SCA.
202
 With the Facebook wall postings and MySpace 
comments, however, the court had to be a little more creative in 
determining the applicability of the SCA. It first determined that the wall 
postings and comments were not strictly public because they can be 
viewed only by fellow social networking users selected by the owner of 
the wall postings and comments.
203
 This conclusion allowed the court to 
compare the wall postings and comments to “private electronic bulletin 
board services (‘BBS’),” which Congressional history and judicial 
precedent reveal as being subject to the SCA.
204
 Next, the court 
interestingly commented that the number of approved users who have 
access to the wall postings and comments—whether it be ten or half a 
million people—was irrelevant in determining whether the owner of the 
postings and comments intended them to be private and thus equivalent to 
the private BBSs protected by the SCA.
205
 Rather, the plaintiff’s 
 
 
 201. Id. at 979. “Congress wanted to protect electronic communications that are configured to be 
private, such as email and private electronic bulletin boards.” Id. (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 
Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002), which surveyed the meaning of the congressional intent 
behind the SCA). 
 202. “[A] ‘provider of e-mail services’ [is] ‘undisputedly an ECS.’” Id. (citing Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of 
Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 203. Id. at 980. Facebook and MySpace users will probably need to adjust their privacy settings to 
prevent the public at-large from being able to view their wall postings and comments, depending on 
whether the default settings for these social networking sites make such wall postings and comments 
available to everyone until users alter their privacy settings. See supra note 91. 
 204. Id. at 980–81. “Court precedent and legislative history establish that the SCA’s definition of 
an [electronic communications system] provider was intended to reach a private BBS.” Id. at 981 
(citing, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop, 302 F.3d at 875; 
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994); Kaufman v. Nest 
Seekers, LLC, No. 05 CV6782 (GBD), 2006 WL 2807177 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006); Inventory 
Locator Service, LLC v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-2695 MA/V, 2005 WL 2179185, at *24 (W.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 6, 2005)). 
 Cf. id. (quoting S. Rep. NO. 99-541, at 36, 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3555, 3590) (emphasis added):  
“The bill [the SCA] does not for example hinder the development or use of ‘electronic 
bulletin boards’ or other similar services where the availability of information about the 
service, and the readily accessible nature of the service are widely known and the service does 
not require any special access code or warning to indicate that the information is private. To 
access a communication in such a public system is not a violation of the Act, since the 
general public has been ‘authorized’ to do so by the facility provider.” 
 205. Id. at 990. “Indeed, basing a rule on the number of users who can access information would 
result in arbitrary line-drawing and likely in the anomalous result that businesses such as law firms, 
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purposeful use of privacy settings to prevent the entire public from 
viewing his comments and postings was most determinative to the court in 
deciding whether the plaintiff could quash the subpoena via the SCA.
206
  
Although the court did not affirmatively rule on the SCA’s extension to 
Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, the court’s instructions 
to the magistrate judge imply that the use of any privacy settings—no 
matter how ineffective they may be—on a social networking site may 
supply a user a cause of action under the SCA against any other users who 
access that user’s personal page without his or her permission.207 This 
scenario, in turn, could plausibly arise in future social networking dust-ups 
at the office similar to any of the recent terminations stemming from 
employees posting material to Facebook and MySpace deemed 
objectionable by their employers.
208
 Consequently, cases like Crispin 
could possibly provide these employees with an SCA cause of action 
against their employers if the employees could prove their employers 
accessed the objectionable material without the employees’ permission.209 
VII. CONCLUSION: TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 
With social media use increasing exponentially every year,
210
 
employers, employees, and the courts will need to figure out how social 
media use can exist without disrupting the functioning of the workplace. 
The courts’ currently consistent adherence to the employment-at-will-
doctrine, and overall reluctance to support exceptions to the doctrine via 
invasion of privacy suits in the private sector,
211
 mean social networkers 
must look to other legal doctrines to protect themselves from being fired 
over their Internet speech. While there is no shortage of solutions to this 
 
 
which may have thousands of employees who can access documents in storage, would be excluded 
from the statute.” Id. 
 206. Id. at 991.  
[E]ither the general public had access to plaintiff’s Facebook wall and MySpace comments, 
or access was limited to a few. . . . Because it appears . . . that a review of the plaintiff’s 
privacy settings would definitively settle the question [of whether the SCA applies to the 
postings and comments], the court . . . remands so that [the magistrate judge] can direct the 
parties to develop a fuller evidentiary record regarding plaintiff’s privacy settings . . . . 
Id. 
 207. See id. at 990–91. 
 208. See supra notes 5 and 22. 
 209. For examples of unauthorized employer access, see Konop, 302 F.3d at 879 (citing various 
parts of § 2701), 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) (2006)), and 880 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 
66–67), and Pietrylo, 2009 WL 3128420 at *3. 
 210. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra Part II.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
672 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:639 
 
 
 
 
problem being offered up by legal commentators,
212
 each one surveyed in 
this Note fails to address the problem in a way that balances an 
employee’s desire to engage in social networking with an employer’s need 
to ensure that his company’s good image is kept intact.  
Therefore, a better solution involves turning to, where applicable, the 
SCA. Using the SCA in employer-employee Internet disputes, as 
described throughout this Note, will still provide an employer much 
latitude in firing employees over blogging or social networking site 
content the employer finds objectionable. The employer will risk violating 
the SCA only by basing his decision to terminate an employee on the 
employer’s unauthorized access of the employee’s private blog or social 
networking site. At the same time, the SCA will allow employees who 
diligently maintain privacy settings on their blogging and social 
networking sites to finally have a viable claim against their employers for 
terminating them over private blog or social networking postings. While 
this proposal will provide only a narrow exception to the general rule that 
anything an employee posts on-line can lead to his or her termination,
213
 it 
will preserve at least some Internet speech freedom for the private sector 
employee who takes the proper steps to secure the privacy of his or her 
blog or social networking site. Such an approach is best suited to protect 
the interests of both employees and employers, while simultaneously 
allowing the 21st century communication phenomena known as social 
networking and blogging to continue flourishing without wreaking havoc 
on the employer-employee relationship.  
Catherine Crane  
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